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  OPINION
                             
3SMITH, Circuit Judge.
This appeal presents three issues related to the federal
preemption of state causes of action.  Plaintiff-appellant Stacy
Holk brought several state law claims against defendant-
appellee the Snapple Beverage Corporation in the Superior
Court of New Jersey.  After removing Holk’s lawsuit to the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey,
Snapple sought to dismiss Holk’s complaint on, inter alia, the
grounds of express preemption, implied field preemption, and
implied conflict preemption.  The District Court granted
Snapple’s motion on the basis of implied preemption.  For the
reasons discussed below, we will reverse.   
I.
A.
Congress has regulated food and beverage labeling for
more than 100 years.  In 1906, it passed legislation commonly
known as the “Wiley Act” that established labeling standards.
Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat.
768, repealed by Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 675, § 902(a), 52
Stat. 1059.  At the time, the Wiley Act was considered a
substantial reform because it prohibited the adulteration and
misbranding of food sold and distributed in interstate commerce.
Pub. L. No. 59-384, §§ 7–8.  By today’s standards, however, the
Wiley Act offered only modest reforms: it “enabled the
4Government to go to court against illegal products but lacked
affirmative requirements to guide compliance.  Labels were not
even required to state the weight or measure—only that a
contents statement, if used, must be truthful.”  U.S. Food and
Drug Administration,  The Story of the Laws Behind the Labels,
Part II (1981).  
Congress replaced the Wiley Act in 1938 with the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”).  Pub. L. No.
75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938).  Mounting public concern over
unsafe food and drug products and marketing prompted its
passage.  United States v. Bhutani, 266 F.3d 661, 665 (7th Cir.
2001).  The FDCA authorized the Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”) to regulate food safety and labeling.
Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, L.L.C., 539 F.3d 237, 251 (3d
Cir. 2008).  Specifically, under the FDCA, the FDA could
“promulgate food definitions and standards of food quality;”
“set tolerance levels for poisonous substances in food;” and take
enforcement action on adulterated and misbranded foods.  Id.
The FDCA had its shortcomings, however.  Neither the FDCA
nor FDA regulations required detailed nutritional information on
all food labels.  Emily J. Schaffer, Is the Fox Guarding the
Henhouse?  Who Makes the Rules in American Nutrition
Policy?, 57 Food & Drug L.J. 371, 404 (2002).  In fact, nutrition
labeling was required only if the manufacturer made a nutrition
claim about the product such as “low-fat” or “high in fiber.”  Id.
5In response to growing concerns from consumer groups
about unsubstantiated health claims on food and beverages, the
FDA and Congress began considering a national labeling law.
Claudia L. Andre, Note, What’s in that Guacamole?  How Bates
and the Power of Preemption Will Affect Litigation Against the
Food Industry, 15 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 227, 232 (2007).  In
1990, Congress passed the Nutrition Labeling and Education
Act (“NLEA”).  Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (1990)
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 343 et seq).  NLEA introduced a
number of substantial reforms: (1) it required nutrition labeling
for nearly all food products under the authority of the FDA, with
exemptions for small businesses, restaurants, and some other
retail establishments; (2) it changed the requirements for
ingredient labels on food packages; (3) it imposed and regulated
health claims on packages; (4) it standardized all nutrient
content claims; and (5) it standardized serving sizes.  The Impact
of the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 on the
Food Industry, 47 Admin. L. Rev. 605, 606 (1995).
B.
Snapple Beverage Corporation (“Snapple”) manufactures
a variety of beverages, including a number of juice and tea-
based drinks.  In its marketing and advertising materials,
Snapple represents that these beverages are “All Natural.”  As
the FDA has acknowledged, “[t]he word ‘natural’ is often used
to convey that a food is composed only of substances that are
not manmade and is, therefore, somehow more wholesome.”
At the time of Holk’s suit, Snapple products contained1
HFCS.  In late 2008, Snapple announced that it was
reformulating its lineup of beverages and replacing HFCS with
sugar in its beverages.  See, e.g., Betsy McKay, Snapple
Introduces Snappier Look, New Formula—Beverage Brand to
Emphasize Tea’s Health Benefits Amid Weaker U.S. Sales;
Sugar Will Be Added to Improve Drinks’ Flavor, Wall St. J.,
Nov. 14, 2008, at B4.  
6
Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, General Principles,
Petitions, Definition of Terms, 56 Fed. Reg. 60,421, 60,466
(Nov. 27, 1991).  Snapple products, however, contained high
fructose corn syrup (“HFCS”), an ingredient manufactured from
processed cornstarch.     1
Stacy Holk bought two bottles of Snapple on May 4,
2007.  She paid $1.09 for each bottle.  She had purchased other
Snapple products over the preceding six years.  Holk contends
that the labels on these products are deceptive.  She argues that
consumers “have been, and continue to be, easy prey for
Snapple’s unlawful activities because of their willingness to pay
a premium price for foods and beverages, including Snapple
beverages, that are represented to be ‘All Natural.’”
C.
Holk filed a class action lawsuit against Snapple in the
Superior Court of New Jersey, asserting claims on the basis of:
(I) the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act; (II) unjust enrichment
and common law restitution; (III) breach of express warranty;
and (IV) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.
Holk’s claims were predicated on her belief that a number of
statements on Snapple’s labels were misleading.  She argued
7that (1) Snapple products were not “All Natural” because they
contained HFCS; (2) Snapple products were not “Made from the
Best Stuff on Earth,” as indicated on the label; and (3) Snapple
falsely labeled some beverages, for example, calling one drink
“Acai Blackberry Juice,” despite the fact that the drink
contained neither acai berry juice nor blackberry juice.  
Snapple removed the case to the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey pursuant to the Class Action
Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1453(b).  It then filed a motion to
dismiss.  The parties subsequently agreed that Holk could amend
her complaint, rather than respond to Snapple’s motion.  In
October 2007, Holk filed an Amended Complaint, which
reasserted that Snapple’s labels were misleading because they
claimed the products were “All Natural” and because Snapple
advertised some products as containing juice that was not in the
beverages.  The Amended Complaint did not allege any claims
based on Snapple’s use of the phrase “Made From the Best Stuff
on Earth.”  Snapple filed a second motion to dismiss, arguing
that Holk’s claims were preempted, that the claims should be
dismissed under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, and that the
allegations failed to state a claim.  Holk responded by dropping
the argument related to the juice components of Snapple
beverages, leaving only the claim that Snapple products
containing HFCS were deceptively labeled “All Natural.”  
The District Court heard oral argument on Snapple’s
motion to dismiss in June 2008.  On June 12, 2008, the District
8Court dismissed Holk’s complaint.  It held that Snapple’s claims
were preempted.  In its opinion, the District Court correctly
identified and discussed the three types of preemption.  It also
noted that Snapple argued that all three types of preemption
were present in this case, as Snapple contended that (1) NLEA
expressly preempted state labeling requirements that are not
identical to federal requirements; (2) the comprehensive nature
of the FDCA and its implementing regulations demonstrate that
Congress intended the federal government to occupy the field;
and (3) that state law stands as an obstacle to the purposes
underlying the FDCA.  Next, the District Court rejected
Snapple’s express preemption argument, stating that there was
not “specific preemptive language” in the FDCA that covered
the claims.  Nonetheless, the Court ruled that “Plaintiff’s claims
in this case are impliedly preempted by the detailed and
extensive regulatory scheme established by the [FDCA] and the
FDA’s implementing regulations.” 
The District Court stated that the FDA has used the broad
authority granted to it under the FDCA to issue comprehensive
regulations governing the labeling and naming of juice drinks.
The Court declared that the comprehensive nature of these
regulations demonstrate that “the FDA has carefully balanced
beverage industry and consumer interests and created a complex
regulatory framework to govern beverage labeling.” Though it
acknowledged that the FDA has not defined “natural,” it found
that the “FDA has in fact contemplated the appropriate use of
the term,” as indicated by the FDA’s definition of “natural
Because the District Court found that Holk’s claims2
were preempted, it did not address Snapple’s primary
jurisdiction argument or whether Holk’s complaint stated a
claim for relief under New Jersey law.   
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flavor” and its informal policy regarding use of the term
“natural.”  The Court also noted that the FDA has the authority
to enforce the FDCA and regulations issued pursuant to it.  In
the Court’s view, these factors counseled in favor of its
conclusion “that the [FDCA] and FDA regulations so
thoroughly occupy the field of beverage labeling at issue in this
case that it would be unreasonable to infer that Congress
intended states to supplement this area.”  
Finally, the District Court deferred to the agency’s
expertise in the regulation of food and beverages.  It asserted
that it would be inappropriate for the Court to set rules, which
the FDA “with all of its scientific expertise” has not yet done.
Thus, the District Court concluded that the claims were
“impliedly preempted” because “permitting states through
statutes or common law causes of action to impose additional
limitations and requirements on beverage labels such as
described here would create obstacles to the accomplishment of
Congress’s objectives . . . .”2
Holk filed this timely appeal.  
10
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1332(d), the Class Action Fairness Act.  This Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of a
district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss is plenary.
Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir. 2005).  When
reviewing the District Court’s decision, we must “‘accept all
factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under
any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be
entitled to relief.’”  Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d
224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd.,
292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)). 
III.
Snapple argues that the District Court’s dismissal must
be upheld “whether analyzed under the doctrine of express
preemption, implied ‘field’ preemption, or implied ‘obstacle’
preemption.”  The preemption doctrine is rooted in Article VI of
the United States Constitution, which states that the laws of the
United States “shall be the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.”  U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.  Under the
Supremacy Clause, federal law may be held to preempt state law
where any of the three forms of preemption doctrine may be
properly applied: express preemption, field preemption, and
11
implied conflict preemption.  Hillsborough County, Fla., v.
Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985).  We are
guided in our preemption analysis “by the rule that ‘[t]he
purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-
emption case.’”  Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 543
(2008) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485
(1996)). 
Additionally, we must begin our analysis by applying a
presumption against preemption.  Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).  “In areas of traditional state
regulation, we assume that a federal statute has not supplanted
state law unless Congress has made such an intention clear and
manifest.”  Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449
(2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).  This requires that, if
confronted with two plausible interpretations of a statute, we
“have a duty to accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption.”
Id.; see also Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1195 (2009);
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518. 
Health and safety issues have traditionally fallen within
the province of state regulation.  This is true of the regulation of
food and beverage labeling and branding.  Plumley v.
Massachusetts, 155 U.S. 461, 472 (1894) (“If there be any
subject over which it would seem the states ought to have
plenary control . . . it is the protection of the people against
fraud and deception in the sale of food products.”).  The federal
government did not begin to regulate the labeling of food
12
products until 1906, when Congress passed the Wiley Act.
Nonetheless, Snapple argues that the presumption against
preemption should not be applied “because of the century-long
tradition of federal regulation over food and beverage
misbranding, and the expansive scheme of juice-beverage
labeling regulation in particular.”  The Supreme Court, however,
rejected a similar argument in Levine and applied the
presumption.  129 S. Ct. at 1195 & n.3.  Accordingly, all of
Snapple’s preemption arguments must overcome the
presumption against preemption, as food labeling has been an
area historically governed by state law.
A.
Snapple argues that Holk’s state law claims are expressly
preempted by NLEA, specifically 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a)(3).  As
a threshold matter, however, we must consider whether this
issue is properly before us.  As stated above, Holk initially
argued that Snapple’s labels were misleading on several
grounds, namely because Snapple claimed the products were
“All Natural” despite containing HFCS and because Snapple
advertised some products as containing juice that was not in the
beverages.  Holk subsequently dropped the argument related to
the juice contents of certain Snapple beverages.  This prompted
Snapple to concede, during oral argument before the District
Court, that it was no longer arguing express preemption:
“[T]here’s only one preemption argument left because of the
dropping of the juice claims. . . . There was expressed [sic]
13
preemption, there was implied field preemption, and now there’s
implied obstacle preemption.  And it’s implied obstacle
preemption that applies to the high fructose corn syrup natural
claims.”  Yet, on appeal, Snapple again raises express
preemption.    
Holk argues that because Snapple did not raise express
preemption before the District Court in relation to her HFCS
argument, Snapple has waived its express preemption argument.
Snapple counters that “[w]here a new ground would support
affirmance, this Court may invoke it so long as it is supported by
the record.”  
First, we note that the District Court did not rule in
Snapple’s favor on express preemption.  The Court stated that
it “agrees with Plaintiff that Congress has not explicitly
preempted Plaintiff’s claims by inserting any specific
preemptive language into the [FDCA] . . . .”  It also noted that
“Snapple’s express preemption arguments were directed at
Plaintiff’s claims concerning the fruit juices contained in
Snapple beverages, which Plaintiff has withdrawn.”  Because
the District Court did not rule in Snapple’s favor on its express
preemption argument, we do not have an express preemption
claim to affirm.  
Second, Snapple is correct that this Court has held that
“we may affirm a correct decision of the district court on
grounds other than those relied upon by the district court.”
14
Cent. Pa. Teamsters Pension Fund v. McCormick Dray Line
Inc., 85 F.3d 1098, 1107 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Helvering v.
Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245 (1937) (“In the review of judicial
proceedings the rule is settled that, if the decision below is
correct, it must be affirmed, although the lower court relied
upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason.”) However, this
rule does not apply to cases in which the party has waived the
issue in the district court.  This Court has stated: “We may
affirm the lower court’s ruling on different grounds, provided
the issue which forms the basis of our decision was before the
lower court.”  Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902,
904 n. 1 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51
F.3d 1137, 1139 n.1 (3d Cir. 1995)); see also Exxon Shipping
Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2616–18 (2008) (stating that an
appellate court’s “reasons for reaching” an untimely express
preemption argument “do not hold up” and that appellate courts
usually will not and should not hear untimely preemption
arguments); Bailey v. Dart Container Corp. of Mich., 292 F.3d
1360, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[A]n appellee can present in this
court all arguments supported by the record and advanced in the
trial court in support of the judgment as an appellee, even if
those particular arguments were rejected or ignored by the trial
court.” (emphasis added)).  
We conclude that Snapple has waived its express
preemption argument with regard to Holk’s HFCS claims.
Though Snapple contended in its two motions to dismiss that
Holk’s juice content claims were expressly preempted by 21
Because we find that Snapple has waived its express3
preemption argument, we will not reach the merits of this issue.
However, we note that the FDA appears to consider HFCS a
sweetener and not a flavoring, and thus the allegedly
troublesome federal statute, § 343(k), would be inapplicable.
See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 184.1866; Committee on Food Chemicals
Codex, Institute of Medicine, Food Chemical Codex 191–92
(4th ed. 1996).  Additionally, § 343(k) is a disclosure
requirement—i.e., it regulates only what companies must place
on a label.  Holk’s claims go to what a company cannot put on
a label for the purposes of commercial marketing, an important
distinction.
15
U.S.C. § 343-1(a)(3), it did not raise this provision with regard
to Holk’s HFCS claim.  In fact, it did not raise any express
preemption argument in response to the HFCS claim and
explicitly disclaimed the applicability of express preemption to
this claim.  This clearly demonstrates that the issue was not
before the District Court.  For this reason, we conclude that the
issue is waived.   3
B.
Field preemption occurs when state law occupies a “field
reserved for federal regulation,” leaving no room for state
regulation.  United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 111 (2000).  It
may also be inferred when “an Act of Congress ‘touch[es] a
field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal
system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on
NLEA expressly preserves implied preemption claims4
based on other provisions of federal law.  It states that the
provision prohibiting implied preemption based on NLEA:
shall not be construed to affect preemption,
express or implied, of any such requirement of a
State or political subdivision, which may arise
under the Constitution, any provision of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act not
amended by [NLEA’s preemption provision
16
the same subject.’”  English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79
(1990) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,
230 (1947)).  Nonetheless, for field preemption to be applicable,
“congressional intent to supersede state laws must be ‘clear and
manifest.’”  Id. (citation omitted).  Snapple asserts that Holk’s
claims are preempted because federal law occupies both the
field of beverage regulation and the field of juice drinks
regulation.  
First, we note that NLEA declares that courts may not
find implied preemption based on any provision of NLEA.  It
states that the Act “shall not be construed to preempt any
provision of State law, unless such provision is expressly
preempted under [21 U.S.C. § 343-1] of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act.”  Pub. L. No. 101-535, § 6(c)(1).
Accordingly, if we are to find that Holk’s claims are impliedly
preempted, we must do so based on provisions of federal law
other than NLEA.   4
subsection], any other Federal law, or any Federal
regulation, order, or other final agency action . . .
.  
Pub. L. No. 101-535, § 6(c)(3).
Though Snapple raised field preemption in its5
memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s
amended complaint, and this argument was not particularized to
Holk’s juice claims, Snapple disavowed the application of field
preemption to Holk’s HFCS claim during oral argument before
the District Court.  Nevertheless, Holk has not put Snapple’s
oral argument waiver before us.  
We have held that “[a]n issue is waived unless a party
raises it in its opening brief, and for those purposes a passing
reference to an issue . . . will not suffice to bring that issue
before this court.”  Laborers’ Int’l Union v. Foster Wheeler
Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks
omitted).  Holk did not argue in any of her briefs that Snapple
waived its field preemption argument.  She did not list the field
preemption issue in her statement of issues, nor did she make
any mention of this issue in the argument section of her opening
or reply briefs.  This failure is particularly noteworthy given that
Holk directly challenged the District Court’s conclusions
regarding field preemption.  Furthermore, during oral argument
before us, Holk’s counsel conceded that Holk was not arguing
waiver with regard to Snapple’s field preemption claims.
Accordingly, we will consider the merits of Snapple’s field
preemption arguments.  
17
Given this limitation, Snapple argues that the FDCA, pre-
NLEA, broadly addressed labeling and the misbranding of food
and beverage products.   Snapple has also argued, both in its5
brief and during oral argument, that the FDA has promulgated,
pursuant to its authority under the FDCA, “exhaustive”
regulations regarding juice products in particular.  Finally,
18
Snapple asserts that the FDA has addressed HFCS and declared
it to be “natural.”  Snapple submits that “[f]ederal law thus
comprehensively regulates misbranding of food in general, juice
beverages in particular, the distinction between natural and
artificial, and even the specific question of whether HFCS can
be ‘natural.’” For this reason, Snapple maintains that the District
Court’s analysis was correct.
Holk argues that the field in this case is not juice
regulation, but rather food and beverage labeling.  She contends
that NLEA forecloses the implied preemption of state law in the
food and beverage field.  She reasons that the limited nature of
the express preemption provision in NLEA, which applies only
to those federal laws specifically enumerated, “would serve no
purpose and would simply be surplus if Congress had intended
to occupy the entire field of food and beverage labeling.”  She
also cites NLEA’s legislative history to demonstrate that
Congress intended to preserve state authority in the food and
beverage labeling field. 
As discussed briefly above, field preemption requires a
demonstration that “Congress . . . left no room for state
regulation of these matters.”  Locke, 529 U.S. at 111; see also
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001).  It
does not appear that Congress has regulated so comprehensively
in either the food and beverage or juice fields that there is no
role for the states.  First, there was no express preemption
provision in the FDCA prior to enactment of the NLEA.  See
19
Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1200 (recognizing the absence of an
express preemption provision in the FDCA); see also Lars
Noah, The Imperative to Warn:  Disentangling the “Right to
Know” from the “Need to Know” about Consumer Product
Hazards, 11 Yale J. on Reg. 293, 351 (1994) (“The [FDCA]
contains no general preemption provision.”).  Thus, we are
lacking a “clear and manifest” expression of Congressional
intent to occupy either field.  
Second, as Holk argues, NLEA’s express preemption
provision demonstrated that Congress recognized the existence
of state laws relating to beverages generally and juice products
specifically.  See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a)(2) (preempting state
laws that conflict, inter alia, with federal law requiring foods to
indicate: (1) the name and location of the manufacturer, as well
as the weight or quantity of food contained in a package; and (2)
the percentage of fruit or vegetable juice contained in a
beverage).  NLEA plainly states that the Act “shall not be
construed to preempt any provision of State law, unless such
provision is expressly preempted under [21 U.S.C. § 343-1] of
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.”  Pub. L. No. 101-
535, § 6(c)(1).  Furthermore, NLEA declares that its express
preemption provision “shall not be construed to apply to any
requirement respecting a statement in the labeling of food that
provides for a warning concerning the safety of the food or
component of the food,” thereby preserving state warning laws.
Pub. L. No. 101-535, § 6(c)(2).  These provisions demonstrate
that Congress was cognizant of the operation of state law and
20
state regulation in the food and beverage field, and it therefore
enacted limited exceptions in NLEA.  As the Supreme Court
instructed in Levine, “‘[t]he case for federal pre-emption is
particularly weak where Congress has indicated its awareness of
the operation of state law in a field of federal interest, and has
nonetheless decided to stand by both concepts and to tolerate
whatever tension there [is] between them.’”  129 S. Ct. at 1200
(quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489
U.S. 141, 166–67 (1989)). 
Furthermore, we note that the FDA has stated that it does
not intend to occupy the field of food and beverage labeling,
even with regard to regulations affecting juice products.  See
Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1201 (recognizing that the Supreme Court
has “attended to an agency’s explanation of how state law
affects the regulatory scheme”).  In a final rule published in
1986 concerning sulfiting agents, a substance present in some
juice drinks, the FDA responded to a comment that it should
adopt a policy that would result in the preemption of state law
with regard to the labeling of food products containing sulfites.
Food Labeling; Declaration of Sulfiting Agents, 51 Fed. Reg.
25,012, 25,016 (July 9, 1986).  There, the FDA stated:  “The
agency does not use its authority to preempt State requirements
unless there is a genuine need to stop the proliferation of
inconsistent requirements between the FDA and the States.
FDA is not persuaded that such a need now exists with regard to
sulfite labeling.”  Id.  Similarly, in two proposed rules regarding
nutrition labeling on food and beverage products, the FDA
21
acknowledged the receipt of numerous comments that urged the
FDA to explicitly preempt contrary state labeling regulations.
Food Labeling; Mandatory Status of Nutrition Labeling and
Nutrient Content Revision, 55 Fed. Reg. 29,487, 29,509 (July
19, 1990) (seeking to amend the nutrition label as it pertains to
the listing of nutrients); Food Labeling; Serving Sizes, 55 Fed.
Reg. 29,517, 29,528 (July 19, 1990) (seeking to amend the
nutrition label as it pertains to serving size).  In both cases, the
FDA responded:  
The preemption issue is complex and divisive:
whether a uniform, national label is necessary for
consumers and manufacturers to function in the
marketplace versus whether States should be
permitted to require additional information for
their residents.  The input of States, as well as
consumers, businesses, and other concerned
parties is essential in evaluating this matter.  FDA
therefore requests comment on the issue of
whether preemption is appropriate.
Food Labeling; Mandatory Status of Nutrition Labeling and
Nutrient Content Revision, 55 Fed. Reg. at 29,509; Food
Labeling; Serving Sizes, 55 Fed. Reg. at 29,528.
Finally, we are reluctant to find field preemption
predicated solely on the comprehensiveness of federal
regulations.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that “the
22
mere existence of a federal regulatory scheme,” even a
particularly detailed one, “does not by itself imply pre-emption
of state remedies.”  English, 496 U.S. at 87; see also
Hillsborough County, Fla., 471 U.S. at 717.  To conclude
otherwise would be “virtually tantamount to saying that
whenever a federal agency decides to step into a field, its
regulations will be exclusive.”  Hillsborough County, Fla., 471
U.S. at 717.  
In the instant case, not only do we lack a “clear and
manifest” statement from Congress of its intent to preempt, but
we also note that the claims in this case are governed by the
presumption against preemption.  These factors, along with the
Supreme Court’s direction that we should not infer field
preemption from the comprehensiveness of a regulatory scheme
alone, lead us to conclude that neither Congress nor the FDA
intended to occupy the fields of food and beverage labeling and
juice products.
C.
Implied conflict preemption is present when it is
“impossible for a private party to comply with both state and
federal requirements.”  English, 496 U.S. at 78–79.
Alternatively, conflict preemption results when state law
“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”  Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).  With regard to the latter,
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“‘[i]f the purpose of the act cannot otherwise be
accomplished—if its operation within its chosen field else must
be frustrated and its provisions be refused their natural
effect—the state law must yield to the regulation of Congress
within the sphere of its delegated power.’” Id. at 67 n.20
(quoting Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912)).  Both
federal statutes and regulations have the force of law and can
preempt contrary state law.  See, e.g., Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1200
(“This Court has recognized that an agency regulation with the
force of law can pre-empt conflicting state requirements.”);
Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, L.L.C., 539 F.3d 237, 243 (3d
Cir. 2008) (“Where Congress has delegated the authority to
regulate a particular field to an administrative agency, the
agency’s regulations issued pursuant to that authority have no
less preemptive effect than federal statutes . . . .”).
Snapple submits that Holk’s claims are preempted
because they stand as an obstacle to federal law.  It contends
that the FDA has adopted a policy regarding the use of the term
“natural” and that this policy would be undermined by Holk’s
suit.  Specifically, it alleges that liability in Holk’s suit would
result in the imposition of “additional conditions not
contemplated by the federal regime.”  Additionally, Snapple
argues that state law must yield if it undermines federal efforts
to create uniform standards. 
Holk counters that her state causes of action do not serve
as an obstacle to federal objectives because there “are no federal
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requirements in place regarding the term ‘natural.’”  She also
asserts that her claims do not conflict with federal law because,
even if she obtained a favorable verdict, Snapple would not be
required to undertake a specific corrective action.    
To determine whether Holk’s claims present an obstacle
to federal law, we must as an initial matter consider whether the
FDA has regulations or has otherwise taken actions that are
capable of having preemptive effect.  In Fellner v. Tri-Union
Seafoods, L.L.C., we declared “that it is federal law which
preempts contrary state law; nothing short of federal law can
have that effect.”  539 F.3d at 243.  We recognized that “there
is no doubt that federal regulations as well as statutes can
establish federal law having preemptive force.”  Id. at 244.
Beyond this, however, we noted that “in appropriate
circumstances, federal agency action taken pursuant to
statutorily granted authority short of formal, notice and comment
rulemaking may also have preemptive effect over state law.”  Id.
For example, agency adjudications could have the force of law
because agencies have the choice to address issues via
rulemaking or adjudication.  Id.  That said, we declared that not
every agency action or statement would have preemptive effect.
Id. at 245.
In determining whether an agency action is entitled to
deference, we will be guided by the Supreme Court’s
pronouncement that “‘[i]t is fair to assume generally that
Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of
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law when it provides for a relatively formal administrative
procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that
should underlie a pronouncement of such force.’”  Id. (quoting
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001)).
Accordingly, we declined in Fellner to “afford preemptive effect
to less formal measures lacking the ‘fairness and deliberation’
which would suggest that Congress intended the agency’s action
to be a binding and exclusive application of federal law.”  Id.
Finally, with respect to agency letters, we noted that “we have
found no case in which a letter that was not the product of some
form of agency proceeding and did not purport to impose new
legal obligations on anyone was held to create federal law
capable of preemption.”  Id.  
In this case, we must determine whether the FDA’s
policy statement on the use of the word “natural” has preemptive
effect.  In 1991, the FDA announced that it was considering
defining the term “natural” for the purpose of future rulemaking.
Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, General Principles,
Petitions, Definition of Terms, 56 Fed. Reg. 60,421, 60,466
(Nov. 27, 1991).  At that time, the FDA recounted its existing
“informal policy” on the use of the term: 
[T]he agency has considered “natural” to mean
that nothing artificial or synthetic (including
colors regardless of source) is included in, or has
been added to, the product that would not
normally be expected to be there.  For example,
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the addition of beet juice to lemonade to make it
pink would preclude the product being called
“natural.” 
Id. (emphasis added).
We conclude that the FDA’s policy statement regarding
use of the term “natural” is not entitled to preemptive effect.
First, the FDA declined to adopt a formal definition of the term
“natural.”  After soliciting comments on the use of the term
“natural,” the FDA recognized that the use of the term “is of
considerable interest to consumers and industry.”  Food
Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, General Principles,
Petitions, Definition of Terms; Definitions of Nutrient Content
Claims for the Fat, Fatty Acid, and Cholesterol Content of Food,
58 Fed. Reg. 2,302, 2,397 (Jan. 6, 1993).  It also stated that it
believed “that if the term ‘natural’ is adequately defined, the
ambiguity surrounding use of this term that results in misleading
claims could be abated.”  Id.  Nevertheless, the FDA declined to
do so: “Because of resource limitations and other agency
priorities, FDA is not undertaking rulemaking to establish a
definition for ‘natural’ at this time.”  Id.  This hardly supports
preemption.  See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 65
(2002) (“Indeed, history teaches us that a Coast Guard decision
not to regulate a particular aspect of boating safety is fully
consistent with an intent to preserve state regulatory authority
pending the adoption of specific federal standards.”). 
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Though the FDA declined to adopt a formal definition of
“natural,” it declared that it would continue to adhere to the
informal policy previously announced.  Food Labeling: Nutrient
Content Claims, General Principles, Petitions, Definition of
Terms; Definitions of Nutrient Content Claims for the Fat, Fatty
Acid, and Cholesterol Content of Food, 58 Fed. Reg. at 2,397.
This too, however, lacks preemptive weight.  The FDA’s request
for comments on use of the term “natural” makes clear that the
FDA’s informal policy predated the request for notice and
comment.  Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, General
Principles, Petitions, Definition of Terms, 56 Fed. Reg. at
60,466.  Because a search of the Federal Register results in
neither earlier references to this policy nor other requests for
comments on the use of the term “natural,” the record
demonstrates that the FDA arrived at its policy without the
benefit of public input.  Additionally, after requesting comments
on the use of the term “natural,” the FDA did not appear to
consider all the comments received.  For instance, the FDA
noted that one comment questioned whether restrictions on the
use of “natural” could raise First Amendment concerns.  Food
Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, General Principles,
Petitions, Definition of Terms; Definitions of Nutrient Content
Claims for the Fat, Fatty Acid, and Cholesterol Content of Food,
58 Fed. Reg. at 2,397.  The FDA did not respond to this
comment, as it declared it moot in light of its decision not to
proceed with a definition.  Id.  In fact, despite numerous public
comments, the FDA announced that it would adhere to its pre-
existing policy on the use of the term “natural” and make no
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changes.  Id. at 2,407.  Finally, the FDA stated that it was
declining to define “natural,” in part, because there were still
“many facets of the issue that the agency will have to carefully
consider if it undertakes a rulemaking to define the term
‘natural.’”  Id.  This statement alone demonstrates a lack of the
kind of “fairness and deliberation” contemplated by Fellner.  
Despite these shortcomings, Snapple argues that the
FDA’s policy is entitled to preemptive effect because the FDA
has enforced the informal policy.  In its briefs to this Court,
Snapple directed our attention to several letters in which the
FDA told a food or beverage manufacturer to remove the term
“natural” from one of its labels for violating the FDA policy on
the use of the term “natural.”  We do not think these letters are
sufficient to accord the policy the weight of federal law.  In
Fellner, we recognized that Congress likely intended to give
administrative action the effect of law when the agency adhered
to “a relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster
the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a
pronouncement of such force.’”  539 F.3d at 245 (quoting Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. at 230).  Thus, we were predominately focused
on the process by which the agency arrived at its decision, rather
than on what happened after that decision was made.  In this
case, the deficiencies inherent in the process by which the FDA
arrived at its policy on the use of the term “natural” are simply
too substantial to be overcome by isolated instances of
We also reject Snapple’s arguments that a letter from a6
FDA official from July 2008 is entitled to weight.  The letter
was not issued as part of any formal rulemaking or adjudication
and was not subject to notice and comment.  Additionally, the
FDA issued the letter in response to a question from interested
parties, rather than doing so in an enforcement action.  Under
Fellner, this letter does not have the force of law—it lacks the
relatively formal procedure and “fairness and deliberation” to
suggest that Congress intended this agency action “to be a
binding and exclusive application of federal law.”  Fellner, 539
F.3d at 245.  
Furthermore, despite Snapple’s assertions, the letter is not
entitled to deference as an agency’s interpretations of its
regulations.  Though the FDA letter regarding HFCS referenced
the regulation pertaining to flavoring, the FDA letter did not
state that it either interpreted or applied this regulation when it
considered whether HFCS was “natural.” 
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enforcement.   6
We believe that neither the FDA policy statement
regarding the use of the term “natural” nor the FDA’s letter
indicating that some forms of HFCS may be classified as
“natural” have the force of law required to preempt conflicting
state law.  Both lack the formal, deliberative process
contemplated in Fellner.  As a result, there is no conflict in this
case because there is no FDA policy with which state law could
conflict. 
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IV.
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that Holk’s
claims are not preempted.  We will reverse the judgment of the
District Court, and remand to the District Court for further
proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion.   
